Angielski
The purpose of this monograph is to determine if transformation to a light armor force is in the best interest of the Army. Since the Objective Force attains the ability to meet the ninety six hour deployment capability by drastic reductions in weapon system size and weight, it is necessary to analyze the ability of the Objective Force to attain full spectrum dominance with a light armored vehicle. This analysis is accomplished through review of: 1) the threat environment, 2) contemporary experiences with the emerging threat, and 3) Objective Force concepts. Each of these areas is evaluated with deployability, survivability, and lethality as the evaluation criteria. The monograph determines that the Objective Force will not be able to attain full spectrum dominance with a light armor organization, and that the Transformation Campaign Plan is an attempt to improve strategic responsiveness at the cost of some of the inherent qualities that makes the Legacy Force such a decisive and capable organization. These two qualities being survivability and lethality, which are attained in the Objective Force by fusing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems into all levels in the organization. The author determines that technology will not advance to a level that will allow the Objective Force to attain the situational understanding necessary to overcome survivability and lethality limitations of a light armor force while conducting operations in a complex urban environment. The conclusions drawn by the author forms the basis for the recommendation that the Army would benefit from approaching transformation as an evolutionary change to the Legacy Force, rather than a revolutionary change to the Objective Force. Allowing the expenditure of scarce national resources to develop joint deployment systems and platforms, rather than a compromise focused on joint deployment limitations.
