Angielski
This study analyzes the evolution of the Joint Lessons Learned System. It examines historical evidence of interoperability issues in US joint military operations from World War II to the present. Three major conflicts: World War II, Korea, and Viet Nam, are surveyed to identify basic issues, factors affecting problem resolution, and general trends. Six contingency operations: Lebanon, 1958; Congo, 1964; Dominican Republic, 1965; Cambodia (Mayaguez), 1975; Iran, 1980; and Grenada, 1983, are then examined in similar fashion. This review provides the rationale for an effective, institutionalized Joint Lessons Learned System. Based on the evidence, the study then traces the evolution of the Joint Lessons Learned System from 1979 to the present. Primary tools of analysis are two US General Accounting Office Reports issued in 1979 and 1985, recent Congressional documents, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, and interviews with key personnel involved in Joint and Army Lessons Learned Systems. Basic conclusions of the study are: interoperability issues are resistant to resolution; clear patterns of failure exist in critical fields including planning, intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, airlift, command and control; and lessons learned activities have not been institutionalized in a systematic and cohesive fashion. Resolution of recurring interoperability issues depends on reversal of these trends. The study concludes that increasingly enhanced threat force capabilities are certain to escalate the costs of success in future military operations. The study argues that the defense community should carefully nurture the embryonic Joint Lessons Learned System and move quickly to develop supporting Service Lessons Learned Systems. Cost-effective recommendations are offered which, if implemented, could significantly alter the effectiveness of current lessons learned activities and assure their survival in times of austerity and challenge.
