Angielski
By spring 1942, Hitler’s forces on the Eastern Front were suffering heavy losses. To replace these casualties, the Army requested the transfer of 20,000 men from the Kriegsmarine and 200,000 airmen from the Luftwaffe to be retrained as infantry. Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, vehemently opposed the plan, fearing it would diminish his political power after several Luftwaffe failures. He proposed instead that the Luftwaffe raise and equip these 200,000 men, arguing their Nazi spirit would benefit the war effort. Hitler, prioritizing political loyalty over military logic, approved the creation of Luftwaffen Felddivisionen (Luftwaffe Field Divisions). Despite being ill-suited for front-line combat, these divisions were deployed in all theatres except North Africa. They were generally ineffective, with many regarded as fit only for garrison duties. On the Eastern Front, they struggled due to the brutal intensity of the fighting. However, two divisions, the 12th and 21st, performed relatively well. This in-depth study examines the Luftwaffe Field Divisions, uncovering the tragic consequences of Göring’s decision. Many Luftwaffe personnel perished in these ill-prepared divisions, whose lives might have been spared had they received proper Army training. The research draws on extensive archival materials, highlighting the human cost of this strategic blunder.
