Brains, Buddhas, and Believing

The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind

Autor: Dan Arnold

Język:

Oprawa: Miękka

Wydawca: Columbia University Press

Dostępność: Dostępna u dostawcy

Wysyłamy za 14-21 dni

171.93 zł

Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights antici...

Informacje o książce

Autor

Dan Arnold

Język

Angielski

Oprawa

Książka - Miękka

Data wydania

2014

strony

328

EAN

9780231145473

ISBN

0231145470

Enbook ID

04558665

Wydawca

Columbia University Press

Waga

458

Wymiary

162 x 229 x 17

Pełny opis

Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipate modern research on the brain and mind. Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists held that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death (its continuity is what Buddhists mean by "rebirth"), they would have no truck with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. Nevertheless, a predominant stream of Indian Buddhist thought, associated with the seventh-century thinker Dharmakirti, turns out to be vulnerable to arguments modern philosophers have leveled against physicalism. By characterizing the philosophical problems commonly faced by Dharmakirti and contemporary philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett, Arnold seeks to advance an understanding of both first-millennium Indian arguments and contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind. The issues center on what modern philosophers have called intentionality -- the fact that the mind can be about (or represent or mean) other things. Tracing an account of intentionality through Kant, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell, Arnold argues that intentionality cannot, in principle, be explained in causal terms. Elaborating some of Dharmakirti's central commitments (chiefly his apoha theory of meaning and his account of self-awareness), Arnold shows that despite his concern to refute physicalism, Dharmakirti's causal explanations of the mental mean that modern arguments from intentionality cut as much against his project as they do against physicalist philosophies of mind. This is evident in the arguments of some of Dharmakirti's contemporaneous Indian critics (proponents of the orthodox Brahmanical Mimasa school as well as fellow Buddhists from the Madhyamaka school of thought), whose critiques exemplify the same logic as modern arguments from intentionality. Elaborating these various strands of thought, Arnold shows that seemingly arcane arguments among first-millennium Indian thinkers can illuminate matters still very much at the heart of contemporary philosophy.

Możesz być zainteresowany

Klienci, którzy kupili tę książkę, kupili również

Najczęściej wyszukiwane

Categories

Authors

Publishers

Produkty

Produkty

Najczęściej wyszukiwane

Categories

Authors

Publishers

Produkty

Produkty

Brains, Buddhas, and Believing

The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind

Informacje o książce

Pełny opis

Możesz być zainteresowany

Klienci, którzy kupili tę książkę, kupili również