German Foreign Intelligence from Hitler's War to the Cold War: Flawed Assumptions and Faulty Analysis

In the Allies' postwar analyses of the Nazis' defeat, the "weakness and incompetence" of the German intelligence services figured prominently. And how could it have been otherwise, when they worked at the whim of a regime in the grip of "ignorant maniacs"? But what if, Robert Hutchinson asks, the worldviews of the intelligence services and the "ignorant maniacs" aligned more closely than these analyses--and subsequent studies--assumed? What if the reports of the German foreign intelligence services, rather than being dismissed by ideologues who "knew better," instead served to reinforce the National Socialist worldview? Returning to these reports, examining the information on enemy nations that was gathered, processed, and presented to leaders in the Nazi state, Hutchinson's study reveals the consequences of the politicization of German intelligence during the war--as well as the persistence of ingrained prejudices among the intelligence services' Cold War successors

Closer scrutiny of underutilized and unpublished reports shows how during the World War II the German intelligence services supported widelyheld assumptions among the Nazi elite that Britain was politically and morally bankrupt, that the Soviet Union was tottering militarily and racially inferior, and that the United States' vast economic potential was undermined by political, cultural, and racial degeneration. Furthermore, Hutchinson argues, these distortions continued as German intelligence veterans parlayed their supposed expertise on the Soviet Union into positions of prominence in Western intelligence in the early years of the Cold War. With its unique insights into the impact of ideology on wartime and postwar intelligence, his book raises important questions not only about how intelligence reports can influence policy decisions, but also about the subjective nature of intelligence gathering itself.